At the start of this month, Lebanon’s government endorsed the U.S.-backed strategy by its army to disarm Hezbollah, the Shiite militia and political group. The Lebanese army is scheduled to commence the plan’s execution this year, with officials describing it as a “historic breakthrough.”
This decision is undeniably momentous. However, it would not have been feasible if Israel had not faced significant challenges in its most recent conflict, and if Bashar Assad’s Syrian regime—a long-standing supporter of Hezbollah and ally of Iran—had not been considerably weakened. Nevertheless, Lebanon now faces an extraordinary chance to reclaim sovereignty over issues of war and peace and to reconstruct its governmental bodies.
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have affirmed their commitment to this endeavor, despite strong resistance from Hezbollah. The group’s leader, Naim Qassem, threatened to resort to violence, and Shiite ministers aligned with Hezbollah and its ally Amal exited the cabinet meeting where the disarmament strategy received approval.
The primary question now, which has largely occupied public discourse in Lebanon, centers on the practical methods the Lebanese army will employ to disarm Hezbollah. Does the army possess sufficient political backing and military capability to achieve this objective without instigating civil conflict?
To find some answers, during my recent visit to Lebanon, I met with Gen. Rodolphe Haykal, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). We convened for several hours in his Yarzeh office, located southeast of Beirut, where we thoroughly discussed his military strategy and his various apprehensions.
Some critics contend that Haykal’s strategy is too cautious. Others argue it lacks sufficient boldness due to the disarmament plan’s absence of a clear or fixed timeline. Nonetheless, I consider it to be strategically astute, tactically robust, and mindful of resources.
The strategy outlines three primary scenarios, each with its own plan and schedule. The first anticipates no cooperation and potentially armed opposition from Hezbollah. It also presumes no concessions from Israel, which persists in maintaining its military presence, and demands a buffer zone within Lebanese territory, a component of what its defense minister has termed a proactive defense strategy to safeguard northern communities from rocket attacks.
The second scenario mirrors a continuation of the current situation, wherein the Lebanese army disassembles Hezbollah’s military installations located south of the Litani River while the group overlooks these actions, and Israeli forces retain their existing posts.
The third scenario envisions Hezbollah transforming into a conventional political party, relinquishing its weapons, with Israel accepting the U.S.-supported plan and withdrawing from Lebanese territory.
Hardly anyone in Lebanon believes the third scenario is probable, as Hezbollah perceives disarming as equivalent to political self-destruction. Over time, the group has successfully linked its arsenal to its core identity and the very survival of the resistance. Concurrently, few anticipate Israel’s departure from the south, considering its recent security challenges in the area.
The first scenario instills fear across Lebanon, and it is the one that Lebanese leaders and Gen. Haykal are most determined to prevent. However, a confrontation with the LAF would not come without significant repercussions for Hezbollah.
The LAF possesses the capability to impose a substantial cost on Hezbollah. The army has significantly enhanced its strength due to years of U.S. military aid, and Hezbollah is currently greatly diminished. Yet, a more compelling reason for Hezbollah to avoid conflict with the LAF is that such an action would defy the will of the majority of Lebanese society, which supports both the army and the new government. It would lead to complete isolation and expulsion from the government. There is already tangible resentment towards Hezbollah for having drawn the nation into a destructive war that has caused widespread devastation.
The second scenario appears more probable, but for it to be maximally effective, General Haykal urgently requires additional resources. Even under the most favorable condition of Hezbollah’s cooperation, Haykal estimated that the LAF might need between 12 to 16 months to completely dismantle the group’s military infrastructure.
Beyond political endorsement, Haykal’s strategy critically depends on a substantial increase in U.S. military aid. The LAF has never before faced the challenge of defending both its southern and northern borders while simultaneously upholding civil peace.
Accompanied by U.S. Deputy Special Envoy Morgan Ortagus, Admiral Bradley Cooper, the new CENTCOM commander, conferred with Haykal to review the army’s strategy and requirements. Foremost among these needs are increased funding for deploying more Lebanese troops along both borders, advanced intelligence and data analysis systems—including unmanned aerial vehicles and artificial intelligence capabilities—as well as tactical and reconnaissance vehicles and helicopters. The Pentagon’s recent decision last week to boost its military assistance represents a constructive move.
The greater the capabilities of the force Haykal can deploy, the more assurance the Lebanese populace—and the United States—will have in the army’s operational readiness.
Despite all the political intricacies, the core element remains a Lebanese army tasked with ensuring stability within a religiously diverse nation. Should the army be physically unable to execute this mission, then the momentous decision to pursue disarmament will prove inconsequential.
Concurrently, the Israeli aspect is paramount. Washington must compel Tel Aviv to consent to the U.S.-proposed, now Lebanese, plan. Without this agreement, Haykal’s task becomes exponentially more challenging. While it is true that Hezbollah once played a key role in compelling Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon, its justifications for maintaining its weapons are now both invalid and specious; today, it has failed to defend Lebanon and instead brought devastation to the nation. Nevertheless, the longer Israel impedes the Hezbollah disarmament initiative, the less amenable the majority of Lebanon’s Shiites will be to it.
Ultimately, Lebanon’s future remains precarious.
