Following reports of events in Venezuela, a common conclusion was swiftly drawn regarding another persistent adversary of the United States. Many argued that if Washington could successfully remove a sitting authoritarian leader from Caracas, then Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could be next. However, this line of thinking is fundamentally mistaken and potentially hazardous, especially for Iranians aspiring for substantive political reform.
Contrary to President Donald Trump’s persistent statements concerning Venezuela, the actual situation is much more stark. Although Maduro was apprehended by U.S. forces and transported to New York, his former Vice President, a staunch regime supporter, was inaugurated as interim President. Her continued grip on power, supported by Venezuela’s Supreme Court and a significant portion of the military, indicates that the state’s fundamental institutions remain intact and the ruling class still holds authority. Even prominent opposition leaders, like Nobel laureate María Corina Machado, have been prevented from influencing the subsequent political landscape, highlighting the constraints of a true political overhaul.
The system that currently exists is one that has endured by adjusting, withstanding pressure, and redefining its international ties while safeguarding its internal core. This result points to a key reality of Trump’s strategy: it is not aimed at regime change or democratization, but at creating a more compliant and controllable government that serves American interests.
This difference is vital for Iran. Anyone believing Trump would seek the complete overthrow of the Islamic Republic misreads his history. The Maduro incident implies that Washington’s main goal is gaining influence, not providing liberation, and securing obedience, not causing a collapse. For the citizens of Iran, this is a grim outlook, as an authoritarian state that is weakened yet still standing is frequently more brutal and less answerable to its people.
The idea that the Maduro scenario could be repeated in Iran is also based on an inaccurate parallel. Venezuela and Iran are vastly different in their political systems, strategic positions, and methods of maintaining power. The notion that military intervention could break Iran’s leadership without setting off broader repercussions is especially risky at a time when Iran is facing internal strain that is not only economic but also deeply political, with unrest occurring in numerous towns and cities.
Simultaneously, the Maduro situation is expected to have a significant impact within Iran’s own ruling circles. For leaders dealing with challenges, fading legitimacy, and impending issues, Venezuela serves as an example of survival. The takeaway is that regimes can withstand intense pressure if they preserve unity, crack down on opposition ruthlessly, and show sufficient adaptability to external forces to ease pressure without surrendering control. If this lesson is learned, it could lead Tehran to increase domestic repression while simultaneously seeking pragmatic compromises internationally, such as through talks with Trump.
This path is profoundly concerning for Iranian society. Substantial portions of the populace are now openly rejecting the Islamic Republic itself, moving beyond calls for mere reform. However, foreign pressure without a viable internal political option does not strengthen their position; it limits it. This is why the present time requires a challenging but essential self-assessment among Iranians. Opposition groups have been successful in declaring what they refuse to accept but have found it difficult to propose a clear, unified alternative. In the absence of a common vision for political structure, governance, and societal agreement, protests are in danger of being exploited by both domestic rulers and foreign nations, neither of which has a stake in real democratic change.
Historical precedent indicates that external pressure has sometimes aligned with the downfall of a system, as with the Soviet Union. However, it more commonly reforms authoritarian governments instead of overthrowing them. A regime that perceives itself as trapped can extend its lifespan by increasing control, further isolating itself from the public, and engaging in riskier actions internationally. Attempting to apply the Venezuela strategy to Iran increases the chance of error and undermines an already precarious regional equilibrium, particularly when tensions with Israel are again nearing critical levels.
The primary takeaway from the Maduro incident should be a warning. External force, without a believable internal political movement, does not result in freedom. For Western policymakers, confusing pressure with transformation risks a scenario where the Islamic Republic is damaged but remains in power. For Iranians, anticipating deliverance from overseas risks postponing the more arduous task of determining the political future they desire, rather than merely the one they want to avoid.
