President Donald Trump’s meeting with Vladimir Putin at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson will reveal whether he is serious about ending the conflict in Ukraine.
Will he emulate the U.S.’s role in 1995, when it persuaded Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian leaders to make peace? Or will he appease Russia by agreeing to Ukraine ceding territory and abandoning NATO aspirations, in exchange for empty promises from Putin? Only the former approach offers a chance for the outcome Trump wants and Ukraine deserves. The latter is akin to trusting Adolph Hitler’s false assurances to Neville Chamberlain in 1938.
Thirty years ago, the U.S. realized it had no choice but to intervene in a war that threatened European security and U.S. interests after UN and European forces failed to stop Serbian aggression in Bosnia and prevent 100,000 deaths.
Led by Richard Holbrooke and supported by President Bill Clinton, Washington obtained agreement from all warring parties on principles for peace talks. The leaders of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia then met with U.S. negotiators at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio. After a month of intense negotiations, they reached the Dayton Peace Accords. Though imperfect, the accords stopped the bloodshed and preserved Bosnia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Any deal requires concessions from all sides and consequences for obstruction. The core principles from the Bosnia negotiations can also be applied to Moscow and Kiev. The first step, achievable quickly, is an immediate ceasefire along current front lines, without preconditions beyond starting talks. The parties must also affirm the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and internationally recognized borders of every state in the region, acknowledging that borders can only be changed by mutual agreement. This aligns with the President’s suggestion of land swaps, provided they are consensual, with the precise boundary decided during overall settlement negotiations.
The sensitive issue of NATO membership should be reserved for formal negotiations. Ukraine should maintain the right to apply but could defer it for several years or while a peace agreement is in effect. During this time, Ukraine would need strong security guarantees from the West, potentially from European forces initially. This period would allow Kiev to strengthen its defenses against future Russian attacks, especially if it chooses not to join NATO or is not admitted.
Crucially, President Trump must not reward Putin’s aggression, due to geopolitical implications beyond the illegality and immorality of his actions. Doing so risks escalating conflict in Europe and Asia, potentially involving the U.S. and undermining Trump’s desire to avoid war. Putin aims to seize all of Ukraine and views the Baltic Republics as within Moscow’s sphere of influence. China is also closely observing the situation. Any perceived weakness from the President in conceding to Moscow’s demands will embolden them, and could also encourage Kim Jong Un to use force against South Korea.
Despite its military challenges, Russia has not yet suffered significant economic consequences. Trump’s recent actions, such as expressing disappointment with Putin and imposing secondary tariffs on India for buying Russian oil, have gained Putin’s attention but are insufficient for a breakthrough. To compel Putin to negotiate seriously, the President needs to increase pressure on Moscow by being prepared to announce further measures. China, not India, is the largest consumer of Russian oil. The Trump Administration should be ready to cut off this avenue and only lift sanctions in stages, tied to compliance with a ceasefire, troop withdrawals, and the terms of a final agreement.
Increasing the supply of arms is another important tool Washington can utilize. The Trump Administration has encouraged European partners to purchase American weapons for Ukraine, such as the recent deal for Patriot missile components. However, more material support and tougher sanctions are needed to convince Russia to end the war.
Washington can offer Putin incentives to cooperate, but only once an overall agreement is reached. The G7 excluded Russia, and Putin was reportedly insulted. Furthermore, U.S.-Russia trade, while currently insignificant, has potential. Restoring both, along with cooperation on energy and infrastructure projects, and even real estate deals, could be beneficial at the appropriate time.
While Trump is right that a solution is possible, it won’t come from trusting Putin or excusing his invasion of Ukraine, seizure of 20% of its territory, and ongoing attacks. It also requires the involvement of Ukraine and European allies in any serious talks. As the President works to bring the parties together, he should remember that no deal is better than a bad deal.
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