Many might suggest that the defense agreement signed by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia during Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman (MBS)’s visit to Washington fell short of expectations by for the kingdom. This sentiment arises because Qatar secured similar guarantees through an executive order from President Donald Trump only two months prior. The question then becomes: why did Saudi Arabia, whom Trump didn’t get a comparable arrangement?
However, this line of questioning and argumentation misses the crucial point.
While it’s factually accurate that the wording of the Qatar executive order appears more robust than that of the SDA (and indeed, more robust than most U.S. security pacts with Middle Eastern allies, excluding NATO member Turkey), there is, in practical terms, no substantial distinction between them.
In fact, even if Trump and MBS had formalized a Senate-ratified defense treaty, legally binding the U.S. to defend Saudi Arabia against external aggression (akin to NATO’s Article 5), the fundamental reality would remain unchanged.
The reason for this is that such defense agreements hold limited significance if they lack specific details on how military cooperation will be enhanced. For the SDA specifically, the path for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to operationalize their renewed defense objectives remains largely undefined.
It’s not my intention to entirely disregard the SDA (or the Qatar executive order), as it does establish a fresh avenue for U.S. and Saudi officials to elevate their . However, the onus now falls on the national security apparatuses and armed forces of both countries to construct the foundational elements—the norms, practices, regulations, legal frameworks, systems, procedures, and organizations—necessary for truly improved security collaboration and coordination.
One observes that the SDA primarily highlights the commercial aspect of advanced U.S. military hardware sales, including and the, with minimal mention of strategic components. This mirrors a common trend in U.S. security policy towards its Arab counterparts, prioritizing military equipment over collaborative security planning and integration. It has become evident that this emphasis on hardware has not fostered Arab partners who are both keen and capable of contributing effectively to shared security objectives.
This pattern is not exclusive to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Countries like Kuwait, Egypt, and Bahrain are recognized by the U.S. as major Non-NATO allies (a designation Trump recently Saudi Arabia to that club). The UAE holds an even more distinguished status, akin only to India within America’s network of global allies and partners. Ultimately, these designations and accompanying privileges primarily serve to facilitate access to more advanced U.S. weaponry and potentially accelerate their acquisition.
It is regrettable that both the U.S. and its Arab partners are underutilizing opportunities. Many other U.S. allies, despite not possessing such preferential or “platinum-member” statuses, have cultivated far deeper and more effective defense relationships with Washington. Consider, , , and : these nations meticulously invest in the intricacies of their security collaboration with the U.S.
Undeniably, both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would benefit from enhanced defense cooperation. For Saudi Arabia, a stronger defense pact with the U.S. is vital for its national security, without which MBS would struggle to achieve the paramount goal of domestic economic transformation.
From the U.S. perspective, increased self-reliance or, ideally, collective action among regional partners in maintaining regional stability and resolving conflicts would free up resources to address other global security concerns. Considering its considerable size, economic power, political leverage, and religious standing within the Arab and Muslim worlds, Saudi Arabia is uniquely positioned to assume a significant leadership role in Washington’s regional security strategy.
Furthermore, among all the essential components of a security partnership, institutional frameworks are arguably the most critical. NATO’s status as the most formidable military alliance ever stems not solely from its collective combat strength but equally from its deep institutional integration and solidarity. Similarly, America’s treaty alliances with South Korea and Japan are exceptionally robust largely due to these strong institutional connections, encompassing both political and military dimensions. Saudi Arabia, however, lacks any equivalent to the institutional depth that Japan and South Korea share with the U.S.
While domestic political considerations, , and the kingdom’s inherent capacity limitations undoubtedly restrict the extent of security cooperation, ample opportunities exist to overcome these obstacles. Given that Saudi Arabia already maintains a and a with the U.S., there is no logical impediment to further strengthening each of these, particularly the latter, across both civilian and military domains.
Absent fundamental shifts in U.S.-Saudi and broader U.S.-Gulf security dynamics that prioritize deeper institutional and military connections over mere equipment provisions, no bilateral defense agreement will achieve its full potential. Such agreements ought to be regarded as instruments to achieve a goal, rather than goals in themselves, with the ultimate objective being a more capable Saudi Arabia and stronger military relationships.
