In his past interactions with China, President Donald Trump was correct on one specific point: He prevented Taiwanese leader Lai Ching-te from making a stopover in New York City while en route to Latin America. This decision contrasted with Joe Biden’s approach, who two years prior permitted Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, a similar transit. Furthermore, unlike Biden, who previously “gaffed” by stating the U.S. would defend Taiwan if attacked by mainland China, Trump clearly signaled his disinterest in engaging in conflict with China.
Such a policy of restraint is laudable. The only issue with the potential to draw these two major powers into a full-scale conflict is the question of Taiwan. For China, reunification with Taiwan is imperative. The key uncertainty lies in the method: will a more powerful China eventually feel confident enough for a peaceful reunification, or will it grow impatient and resort to force?
A concise answer is that it hinges on the Taiwanese authorities. Both Lai and his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, are members of the Democratic Progressive Party, which champions a distinct Taiwanese national identity. However, Lai, who once described himself as a “practical worker for Taiwan independence,” appears to pose a greater risk. Lai has obstructed cross-strait people-to-people exchanges, citing concerns about “opposing China’s united front work.” He has labeled the Chinese mainland as “foreign hostile forces” and outlined 17 strategies to deter individuals in Taiwan who support cross-strait interactions.
Lai’s characterization of the Chinese mainland as “foreign hostile forces” crosses Beijing’s red line—the secession of Taiwan from the mainland. China’s Anti-Secession Law mandates the use of force if all avenues for peaceful reunification are deemed exhausted. So, how much patience does China truly have left?
Both Beijing and Washington maintain a strategy of strategic ambiguity while preparing for worst-case scenarios. China has frequently conducted large-scale military drills near the island, while the U.S. has strengthened its forward military presence along the “first island chain,” extending from Japan and South Korea to the Philippines. Yet, Beijing has not specified a deadline for reunification, and Washington remains vague on whether it would offer military assistance to Taipei should the Chinese mainland initiate an attack.
The challenge is that time is not in America’s favor, given China’s rapid military modernization and its geographical proximity to the potential conflict zone. U.S. allies also appear hesitant. Both Japan and Australia have declined American requests for a commitment to a hypothetical conflict with China over Taiwan, emphasizing that any decision would be made by their respective governments at the time.
If preventing direct war with Russia over Ukraine is a primary American objective, then surely, avoiding a conflict with the world’s second-largest economy and another nuclear power aligns with America’s highest national interest. Therefore, what steps can President Trump take?
A proposed strategy for Washington
Firstly, President Trump could establish a formal policy prohibiting any Taiwanese leader from making stopovers in significant American cities like New York or Washington. Such transit stops, unlike those previously made in Hawaii or Alaska, are often utilized by Taiwanese authorities to gauge the U.S. government’s stance on evolving cross-strait dynamics.
Secondly, he should manage the public statements of his subordinates. Over the past decade, several American generals have made provocative remarks concerning the potential timing of a mainland Chinese assault on Taiwan. For example, Air Force General Mike Minihan controversially suggested in a memo that his intuition told him the U.S. would fight China within the next two years. This statement was subsequently disavowed by the Pentagon, which stated it did not reflect the department’s official view.
Similarly, U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth recently asserted that an attack on Taiwan was “imminent” and proposed 2027 as a potential date. These comments starkly contrasted with those of his predecessor, Lloyd Austin, who stated at the same forum that a conflict was neither impending nor unavoidable.
Thirdly, President Trump should caution Lai to “zip his lip,” much as he did to former Russian President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev after Medvedev criticized Trump’s foreign policy. Other precedents exist; when DPP leader Chen Shuibian called for a referendum on relations with mainland China in 2003, President George W. Bush publicly reprimanded him.
Fourthly, President Trump should withdraw all U.S. military personnel from Taiwan. The 1972 joint communiqué on establishing China-U.S. diplomatic ties affirmed the ultimate goal of removing all American forces and military installations from the island. And is such training truly effective? Even Taiwan’s own assessments of its military are grim. Taiwanese troops are sometimes derisively called “strawberry soldiers.” Former Taiwanese leader Ma Ying-jeou has stated that, in the event of war with China, the “first battle will be the last.”
Finally, President Trump should encourage current Taiwanese authorities to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus between Beijing and Taipei, in order to re-initiate cross-strait dialogues. Beijing has repeatedly indicated that any differences can be discussed under the framework of “One China.” This represents the optimal path to de-escalate tensions across the strait, and further progress could follow. Without Taiwan’s acceptance of “One China,” it becomes a question of when, rather than if, a conflict will erupt.
President Trump aspires to be recognized as a peacemaker. He appears to wield significantly more authority than during his initial term. He should leverage this influence to reduce the dangers in the strait. The last thing he needs is to provide Lai with a blank check that might be filled with American blood.
