A fundamental principle of power dynamics dictates that no entity willingly surrenders control. Another key tenet suggests that today’s partners can become tomorrow’s adversaries, and vice versa. These principles are currently evident in Gaza, where Hamas is reportedly engaged in conflict even as President Donald Trump’s peace agreement ostensibly introduces a new chapter for the Middle East.
The conflict has severely damaged Gaza’s administrative and law enforcement systems. Hamas militants, though their numbers have decreased, maintain their resolve and are reportedly engaged in confrontations with other groups, seemingly vying for dominance in the region. Some analysts interpret this as a struggle between the militant organization and a populace weary of its governance. However, the true situation in Gaza is, as usual, far less clear-cut.
The factions currently opposing Hamas are mainly clans with extensive backgrounds in criminal activity and brutality. These are not champions of democracy or human rights. They are, simply put, criminals who have consistently observed the political climate and aligned themselves with the dominant power for decades.
During Hamas’s stringent control over Gaza, these clans reached agreements with the militants. This arrangement granted them unrestricted influence over the territory’s economic activities, both official and unofficial. Throughout the conflict, they offered some financial assistance to their struggling members. Now, they perceive a chance to seize control for themselves.
This scenario—where a defeated party in a conflict strenuously endeavors to retain authority—is an enduring aspect of warfare. Examples range from Japanese soldiers resisting on Pacific islands post-World War II to Saddam Hussein’s supporters in Iraq after the invasion; vanquished forces seldom concede defeat without resistance. Hamas, having governed Gaza since 2007, possesses even stronger motivations to continue fighting. The organization functions not just as a governing body or a military group, but as an intertwined ideology, social movement, and system of patronage. For Hamas, relinquishing control in Gaza signifies the loss of its fundamental purpose.
The factions opposing Hamas have had ample time to get ready for this confrontation and are benefiting from the prevailing post-war conditions. For over a year, Israel has promoted the concept of local governance, aiming to circumvent both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. In March 2024, Hamas executed a prominent leader of the influential Doghmush clan, accusing him of collaborating with Israeli forces, plundering aid shipments, and illicitly selling the stolen goods. Another paramilitary group, referred to as the, is reportedly receiving backing from the U.S.-funded Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
Certain Western analysts have focused on accounts suggesting that specific clans and groups, including the Shabab, are openly collaborating with Israeli forces, viewing this as a repudiation of Hamas’s extreme ideology. This interpretation fundamentally misunderstands Gaza’s political environment. Both the Palestinian territories and Lebanon have a well-established history of armed factions cooperating with Israel when it serves their interests, only to then target their previous allies once their own power is secured. These pragmatic alliances should not be confused with fundamental shifts in strategy. Consider Hamas’s own origins: the group emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood with discreet Israeli backing in the 1980s, as Israeli officials sought a counterweight to Yasser Arafat’s secular PLO. The eventual outcome is well-known.
The clans now presenting themselves as adversaries to Hamas are equally unreliable and certainly no less prone to violence. They are merely more driven by self-interest.
However, the true unpredictable element in Gaza’s power dynamics does not lie with these clans. Western experts frequently disregard the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a militant group that has traditionally functioned as Hamas’s subordinate ally in the territory. Before the conflict, estimates placed PIJ’s combatants in the thousands, while Hamas was believed to possess tens of thousands. Should the post-war numbers be more comparable, PIJ leadership might consider itself sufficiently powerful to assert a dominant role.
PIJ possesses an attribute absent in the clans: political legitimacy, or its militant equivalent. The organization is more deeply embedded within the Palestinian Territories, shares an ideological basis akin to Hamas, boasts cohesive leadership, and—significantly—receives consistent support from Iran. In contrast to the clans, whose primary drivers are power and financial gain, PIJ asserts revolutionary bona fides and maintains an organizational framework that has endured decades of Israeli operations. Furthermore, its substantial presence in the West Bank enables it to access resources beyond Gaza.
Should Hamas fail to maintain its hold on Gaza, PIJ stands as the most probable successor. For Israel, this outcome would simply mean replacing one Iranian-supported militant group with another.
The more profound issue is that Gaza has devolved into a chaotic, lawless state, where existence for its beleaguered inhabitants caught amid the conflict is likely to be harsh, violent, and brief. Regardless of its other positive or negative aspects, Trump’s peace initiative neglected to resolve the core questions of Gaza’s governance and the establishment of order. There is no stabilizing force, no peacekeepers, and no system in place to deter armed factions from resolving disputes through combat instead of democratic processes.
In part, this disorder is an inherent consequence of warfare. Conflicts invariably generate power voids, which armed entities quickly move to occupy. However, the situation unfolding in Gaza points to a more particular oversight: the lack of any comprehensive strategy for the territory’s administration and safety. Trump successfully negotiated a ceasefire, a significant accomplishment. Yet, truces that lack robust security frameworks are simply pauses between cycles of conflict.
Predatory forces are converging on Gaza and are expected to persist for an extended period. Hamas will not readily cede its power, the various clans will continue to seek opportunities for gain, and PIJ will bide its time. In the interim, the general population of Gaza will suffer the repercussions. The true tragedy is not merely that these events are unfolding, but that anyone familiar with the region’s past could have foreseen them.
