Israeli army tank stationed on a hill overlooking northern Gaza

After fifteen months of conflict, the ceasefire brings immense relief to Palestinians, Israelis, and the wider Middle East. The agreement, however, is limited in scope, encompassing a small area and primarily consisting of a pause in hostilities, prisoner exchanges, and a partial Israeli withdrawal. Considering Israel’s fragile coalition and the deep divisions between the warring parties, this fragile truce could easily collapse or expire before fostering lasting peace. Nonetheless, even a temporary de-escalation provides an opportunity for reflection.

The Middle East’s volatile political landscape is characterized by shifting alliances and power dynamics, but typically only one element changes at a time. This recent conflict, despite Gaza’s small size, caused a more significant and rapid transformation than anticipated. The regional situation hasn’t undergone such a dramatic shift since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In that six-day war, Israel seized East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula, altering the status quo, shattering Arab hopes, increasing America’s involvement, and establishing Israel as an occupying power, subjugating millions of Palestinians.

The Gaza conflict, however, has endured far longer and resulted in far greater loss of life than any previous Arab-Israeli conflict. A recent Lancet study estimates 70,000 Gazan deaths, more than triple the total Israeli casualties (military and civilian) since 1948. Hamas’s October 7th breach of Israeli defenses and the subsequent loss of 1,200 Israeli lives in a single day shocked Israel. Yet, like in 1967, the conflict’s repercussions extended far beyond the immediate participants, impacting neighboring countries and beyond in unexpected ways.

For example, in Cairo, a guest ironically highlighted Yehya Sinwar’s, the Hamas leader behind the October 7th attack (killed by an Israeli drone a year later), achievements. The guest sarcastically noted how Sinwar, in a single year, accomplished what millions had failed to achieve over decades: weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon, contributing to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, dismantling Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” extending Benjamin Netanyahu’s premiership, and relieving Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi from financial and political pressure.

This sarcasm is justified. Each of these outcomes is a setback for Hamas. Hamas was allied with and funded by Iran, now strategically weakened. The Assad regime was not particularly friendly to Hamas, yet its fall allowed Israel to eliminate Syria’s heavy weaponry, neutralizing a potential adversary for decades. Netanyahu’s popularity in Israel increased after the war, and El-Sisi, a harsh opponent of the Muslim Brotherhood, received aid from Western creditors for remaining silent on Gaza.

Sinwar, at a tremendous cost to both Israelis and Palestinians, did achieve some goals. He brought the plight of Palestinians back into the global spotlight, hindering Israel’s efforts to expand treaties with Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, and exposed Israel’s military vulnerabilities and provoked a disproportionate response that damaged its moral standing. However, many in the region question whether Sinwar’s gamble was worthwhile.

Hamas’s reckless actions left Israel, briefly similar to the post-1967 situation, as a near-uncontested regional power. Its Arab neighbors are militarily weaker and preoccupied with internal issues, showing little concern for the Palestinians. Iran suffered setbacks, and even nuclear weapons would only escalate tensions with Israel, a distant country many Iranians don’t consider an enemy. The arrival of a more pro-Israel administration in Washington, which provided $17.9 billion for Netanyahu’s Gaza offensive, further underscores Israel’s military dominance.

However, as in 1967, Israel’s victory comes with unwanted responsibilities. Then, some Israelis warned that occupying an angry population was morally reprehensible and could harm Israeli society. This advice was largely ignored, leading to a policy of gradual annexation and colonization. Today, Israeli and Palestinian populations are nearly equal in size but drastically unequal in rights, wealth, and outlook, hindering peaceful coexistence.

Due to unwavering support from the US and other Western allies, persistent Arab instability, and Israel’s rightward shift, this course has continued. The temptation to intensify this approach is now stronger, with Gaza in ruins and regional rivals subdued. Can Israel show magnanimity in victory? The outlook is not promising.