On June 18, 2023, a submersible experienced a catastrophic implosion during a voyage to view the Titanic wreckage, resulting in the death of all five individuals on board. The passengers were Stockton Rush, CEO of OceanGate, the company responsible for the submersible’s design; British-Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleman; explorer Hamish Harding; and Paul-Henri Nargeolet, a veteran of 36 dives to the Titanic.
Two years after the Titan submersible’s implosion, OceanGate has ceased all commercial and exploratory ventures. The U.S. Coast Guard has yet to release the findings of its investigation into the incident. Meanwhile, a Netflix documentary, released on June 11, presents its own analysis of the implosion’s causes. It includes interviews with former OceanGate employees who express that the disaster was predictable and that the submersible’s design was inherently flawed.
TIME spoke with director Mark Monroe about the warning signs that preceded the OceanGate submersible tragedy.
Flawed materials
The documentary reveals that the submersible’s construction materials were inadequate from the outset. Tests indicated that the carbon fiber used in the submersible was unsuitable for the extreme pressures at the Titanic’s depth. During these tests, the fiber repeatedly fractured under pressure, producing audible popping and snapping sounds as the strands broke.
“Everyone says the sound happened when the submersible was actually very close to the surface,” Monroe notes. “You would think that would have been a clear warning that something was wrong.”
Former employees informed the filmmakers that, given the ongoing issues even on its 80th test dive, a successful dive was unlikely. “Maybe no test would have ever shown that it was safe to do it,” Monroe suggests. “There’s not enough positive testing that shows that it’s something that you should be doing with paying customers.”
Monroe states that validating carbon fiber’s safety for use in the hull would have required millions of dollars and years of additional testing. Furthermore, OceanGate’s financial stability was uncertain. “What is clear from my research and from talking to people is that they were not making money,” Monroe says. “There’s zero chance that OceanGate was actually turning a profit.”
Rush’s determination to make carbon fiber work, despite the risks, had tragic consequences. As Monroe puts it, “Had he followed the industry standard, sure, he might not have been able to make a carbon fiber submersible and take it to the Titanic, but maybe those people would still be alive.”
Cutting corners
Engineers interviewed in the documentary portray Rush as imprudent, often expediting tests and showing insufficient concern for passenger safety. A critical red flag was Rush’s decision to forgo a third-party inspection of the submersible, a violation of industry norms. Monroe adds that Rush also circumvented regulations requiring vehicle registration, and the submersible was never registered.
The original hull cracked during the project, necessitating the construction of a new one. A scaled-down version of the new hull underwent the same pressure tests as its predecessor.
Despite the absence of a single successful test, OceanGate proceeded with the submersible’s manufacturing. At this point, Emily Hammermeister, the lead engineer’s assistant at OceanGate, resigned. In the documentary, she expresses her discomfort with “bolting people into the sub.”
She was not the only dissatisfied employee. Monroe explains their perspective: “I think a lot of people didn’t understand, why are we going forward if we can’t get the model to not implode?”
Viewers will hear a recording of David Lochridge, a submersible pilot and former operations director, being verbally berated by Rush after Lochridge documented his safety concerns in a memo. This recording surfaced during the U.S. Coast Guard’s investigation.
“Every expedition we’ve had, we’ve had issues,” Lochridge can be heard saying in the audio. Rush accused Lochridge of failing to grasp his vision, which he characterized as “doing weird sh-t” that’s “definitely out of the mold.” The documentary suggests that Rush interpreted any criticism of his project as a personal affront.
Lessons from the disaster
Monroe hopes that the Titan tragedy will encourage viewers to question the necessity of such expeditions in the future, stating, “We’ve seen a fascination with the Titanic, and the desire for those with means to do something in this world that others can’t do. This experience feeds into that desire.”
Monroe also hopes the documentary will encourage viewers to be skeptical of tech founders who boast about defying conventions and circumventing rules, cautioning, “While that may be the case in some industries, when you’re taking money from people, and their lives are at risk, I think it’s very dangerous.”
“`
